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People v. Hughes. A Pretrial Procedure for
Excluding Testimony Influenced by
Hypnosis
I. Introduction
In the past decade there has been a dramatic increase in the
use of hypnosis as a tool of criminal investigation.' Typically, a
victim of or a witness to a crime is hypnotized by law enforce-
ment officials in an effort to elicit more information about the
criminal event than the witness has previously been able to re-
call.' If the subject is able to recall additional information under
hypnosis, the information may be used in two ways. Initially, the
police may use the new lead to identify a suspect or to locate
new evidence.3 These are purely investigative uses.4 Later, the
hypnotically refreshed recollections may be included in the wit-
ness' testimony at a criminal trial.5 This testimonial use has re-
ceived conflicting treatment in the courts," and the admissibility
of hypnotically refreshed testimony remains a controversial
subject.7
1. See Diamond, Inherent Problem in the Use of Pretrial Hypnosis on a Prospec-
tive Witness, 68 CALIF. L. REv. 313, 313 (1980) (calling the usage widespread and noting
that in both small and large cities police are being trained to hypnotize and question
witnesses). See also Feldman, Hypnosis: Look Me in the Eye and Tell Me That's Ad-
missible, 8 BARmsTER No. 1, Spring 1981, at 5 (Los Angeles' "Investigative Hypnosis
Program" reports new information obtained in 80% of sessions with witnesses).
2. "Witness" as used in this Note may also refer to the victim of a crime.
3. Diamond, supra note 1, at 316 n.7(f). See, e.g., an unreported 1977 Alameida
County, California case, People v. Woods, in Brody, Hypnotism v. Crime: A Powerful
Weapon or an Abused Tool?, N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1980, at C1, col. 1 (hypnotic recall of
license plate numbers by victim of kidnapping led police to perpetrators).
4. Dr. Martin Orne, a noted expert in the clinical uses of hypnosis, has endorsed the
investigative use of hypnosis with a qualification: "To the extent that the victim or wit-
ness, police, .. . and hypnotist alike share no preconceived bias about what might have
occurred, the situation approaches the ideal case for hypnosis to be most appropriately
employed: to develop investigative leads." Orne, The Use and Misuse of Hypnosis in
Court, 27 INr'L J. OF CLIN. & ExPaa. HYPNosis 311, 328 (1979).
5. For cases utilizing hypnotically refreshed testimony, see cases cited infra note 50.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 45-73.
7. See Note, The Admissibility of Testimony Influenced by Hypnosis, 67 VA. L.
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In 1983, the New York Court of Appeals held in People v.
Hughes' that hypnotically refreshed testimony is inadmissible
per se in a criminal trial.9 The court also held that before a pre-
viously hypnotized witness may testify, a pretrial hearing is nec-
essary to distinguish prehypnotic recollections from those recol-
lections recalled through hypnosis.' 0 The court stated that
prehypnotic recollections are admissible only when the prosecu-
tor" is able to prove at the pretrial hearing that his witness'
prehypnotic recollections were not altered or otherwise affected
by the hypnosis. 12
After reviewing the nature of hypnosis and the legal treat-
ment accorded hypnotically refreshed recollections in Part II,
this Note reviews the factual and procedural history of Hughes
in Part III. Part IV examines the court of appeals' holding and
reasoning- In Part V, analysis of the case includes a review of
alternative rationales that might have been used to find the tes-
timony inadmissible, an examination of the procedure at the
pretrial hearing, and a suggested approach concerning the con-
tent and operation of the hearing.
II. Background
A. Hypnosis
Hypnosis is a phenomenon that cannot be adequately ex-
plained in terms of scientific causation.'3 The American Medical
Association has termed it a condition of altered attention," but
l~v. 1203, 1216-20 (1981).
8. 59 N.Y.2d 523, 453 N.E.2d 484, 466 N.Y.S.2d 255 (1983).
9. Id. at 545, 453 N.E.2d at 495, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 266.
10. Id. at 546, 453 N.E.2d at 496, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 267.
11. Prosecutorial use of hypnosis on witnesses is clearly the most common use in
criminal cases, and was at issue in Hughes. This Note concerns only this usage. For use
of hypnosis on a defendant, see Warner, The Use of Hypnosis in the Defense of Crimi-
nal Cases, 27 INT'L J. OF CLIN. & EXPER. HYPNOsIs 417 (1979).
12. 59 N.Y.2d at 547-48, 453 N.E.2d at 497, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 268. In this Note, hyp-
notic effect on prehypnotic recollection is termed "taint." "Taint" as used herein does
not refer to or concern fourth amendment "fruits of the poisonous tree" or the exclusion-
ary rule.
13. Diamond, supra note 1, at 321 (noting the concurrence of expert opinion that
hypnosis is a phenomenon rather than an observable scientific process).
14. 168 J. A.M.A. 186, 187 (1958). This definition dispels the common myth that the
subject is asleep during hypnosis.
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it is best understood by noting the effects upon the hypnotized
subject. The most pronounced effect is the subject's increased
susceptibility to suggestions." A leading authority on hypnosis
noted that the "[subject's] dissociated attention is constantly
sensitive to and responsive to cues from the hypnotist."' Fur-
thermore, because most hypnotic subjects wish to please the
hypnotist with their performance, the subject may respond in a
manner he perceives to be favored by the hypnotist.18 Even the
purpose of the hypnotic session may act as an agent of sugges-
tion.19 Although steps may be taken to minimize the planting of
suggestions,20 the subject will remain highly susceptible to
them."1 This phenomenon occurs because the subject's dissoci-
ated attention lacks the normal critical judgment necessary to
distinguish the real from the imagined or from the suggested.2
Another common effect of hypnosis is the subject's in-
creased confidence in recollections after the hypnosis has end-
ed.2 3 Such certitude is acquired during the hypnosis through "re-
viewing the events in the hypnotic context and having the mem-
ories legitimized by the hypnotist. 2 4 Legitimization occurs, for
example, when the hypnotist suggests that the subject will accu-
rately recall the desired information. Whether the subsequent
recall is accurate or not, the subject accepts, through suggestion,
15. C. CHEEK & L. LECRON, CLIMCAL HYPNo-THBBAPY 13 (1968). See also Diamond,
supra note 1, at 314.
16. Spiegel, Hypnosis: An Adjunct to Therapy, in 2 COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF
PSYCHIATRY § 30.4, at 1844 (A. Freedman, H. Kaplan & B. Sadock 2d ed. 1975).
17. Diamond, supra note 1, at 333, 335.
18. Orne, supra note 4, at 326. For example, a subject recalled the events of a cer-
tain date in the future when requested to do so by the hypnotist. Id. at 321-22.
19. Diamond, supra note 1, at 333. This point may have been important in People v.
Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d 523, 453 N.E.2d 484, 466 N.Y.S.2d 255 (1983), where the purpose of
the hypnotic session was to identify a suspect.
20. See infra text accompanying note 68.
21. E. HLGARD, THE EXPERENCE OF HYPNOSIS 9 (1968) (observing that the process is
inherently suggestive, with the hypnotist's suggestions inducing and controlling the
hypnosis).
22. Diamond, supra note 1, at 340.
23. Orne, supra note 4, at 332.
24. Id.
25. Diamond, supra note 1, at 340. See also State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 769
(Minn. 1980) (hypnotist telling subject: "You will remember very clearly everything that
happened on the 13th and 14th.").
19841
3
PACE LAW REVIEW
his recall as accurate.2 The result is a residual unwarranted con-
fidence in hypnotic recollections.27 The same is true of
prehypnotic recollections repeated during hypnosis.2 8
Perhaps the most troubling effect of hypnosis, with regard
to testimonial usage, is the subject's ability to confabulate in a
convincing manner while hypnotized. 9 Confabulation occurs
when the subject "imagine[s] incidents to fill memory gaps, by,
for instance, imagining that he has experienced something he
has simply heard from others. He may also intentionally fabri-
cate events perceived to be beneficial to himself or those con-
ducting the hypnotic session."30 Compounding this problem of
confabulation is the subject's inability to distinguish, after the
hypnosis, between actual fact and confabulated "recollections."3 1
These effects of hypnosis, increased confidence in recollec-
tions, the risk of confabulation, and high susceptibility to" sug-
gestion, are germane to the admissibility of hypnotically re-
freshed testimony. Although researchers have noted other less
common effects,3 2 they all are attributable to these three.33 Un-
derstandably, then, of the courts that have considered the issue
of hypnotically refreshed testimony, all have focused on the
three most common effects."
B. Case Law
Because hypnosis is an inherently suggestive method of
identification, 5 federal 6 and state7 due process questions may
26. Diamond, supra note 1, at 339-40.
27. Id. at 339.
28. Id. See also Orne, supra note 4, at 320. "Even though prior to hypnosis [the
subject] had been very uncertain about his memory.. . he will now report his 'memo-
ries' consistently and with conviction" after repeating them while hypnotized. Id.
29. Diamond, supra note 1, at 337. See also Spector & Foster, Admissibility of Hyp-
notic Statements: Is the Law of Evidence Susceptible?, 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 567, 588 (1977).
30. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d at 535, 453 N.E.2d at 489, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 260.
31. Diamond, supra note 1, at 335.
32. Other effects of hypnosis include role behavior, lack of planning initiative, and
amnesia for what transpired during the hypnosis. See E. HLGARD, supra note 21, at 6-10.
33. See supra text accompanying notes 15-31
34. See, e.g., United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
885 (1979); People v. Gonzales, 417 Mich. 968, 336 N.W.2d 75 (1983); State v. Koehler,
312 N.W.2d 108 (Minn. 1981).
35. See supra text accompanying note 15.
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be raised, since other types of suggestive identification methods
have come under constitutional scrutiny in both the United
States Supreme Court and the New York Court of Appeals. In
Stovall v. Denno,38 the Supreme Court held that a defendant's
due process rights are violated when police use an impermissibly
suggestive identification procedures' to test witness recollection.
The point at which an identification procedure becomes imper-
missibly suggestive, the Court stated, is determined by the total-
ity of the circumstances surrounding the identification event,
and is thus a factual determination.4
The New York Court of Appeals, in People v. Adams,41
stated that New York constitutional protections, as applied to
pretrial identifications, go further than the federal standard.43 In
Adams, witnesses to a robbery were taken to a police station to
view a line up consisting of only the suspects in custody. Fur-
thermore, the witnesses had been told the suspects were in cus-
tody. The suspects were held from behind by police while the
witnesses viewed them.43 When the case reached the court of ap-
peals, the court held that these impermissibly suggestive factors
pervaded the subsequent identification and thus invalidated it.44
36. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The fourteenth amendment guarantees that no state
shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." The
Supreme Court applied a due process analysis to a suggestive identification in Stovall v.
Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967). See Falk, Posthypnotic Testimony - Witness Competency
and the Fulcrum of Procedural Safeguards, 57 ST. JoHN's L. Rav. 30, 56-59 (1983).
37. N.Y. CONsT. art. I, § 6. "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law." Id. Because confabulation ("recalling" false memories) is a
known risk of hypnosis, the New York due process analysis may be applicable. See Peo-
ple v. Schwartzman, 24 N.Y.2d 241, 250, 247 N.E.2d 642, 648, 299 N.Y.S.2d 817, 825,
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 949 (1969) (allowing possibly false evidence to remain uncorrected
denies due process of law); People v. Smith, 117 Misc. 2d 737, 759, 459 N.Y.S.2d 528, 543
(Sup. Ct. Dutchess County 1983) (trial court due process analysis of hypnotically re-
freshed testimony). See also infra text accompanying notes 41-44.
38. 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967).
39. In Stovall, the suspect was taken to the hospital where the attack victim was
recouperating, for the purpose of possible identification. The Court held that this was
permissibly suggestive since the victim could not travel to the police station to attempt
identification in a line up with others. Id.
40. Id.
41. 53 N.Y.2d 241, 423 N.E.2d 379, 440 N.Y.S.2d 902 (1981).
42. Id. at 250, 423 N.E.2d at 383, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 906. See also Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d
at 542, 453 N.E.2d at 493, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 267.
43. People v. Adams, 53 N.Y.2d at 249, 423 N.E.2d at 383, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 905.
44. Id.
5
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In 1968, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals became the
first court to rule on the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed
testimony in a criminal case in Harding v. State.45 In that case,
the victim of a rape and shooting was unable to identify her at-
tacker until she was hypnotized. ' After testimony by the hypno-
tist that hypnosis does not render the subject susceptible to sug-
gestion, 7 the court admitted the victim's hypnotically refreshed
identification.4 ' The court cautioned the jury, however, not to
give undue weight to the testimony.4e
Harding shifted judicial focus from questions of admissibil-
ity to issues of witness credibility and evidentiary weight. After
Harding, an increasingly large number of courts followed this
approach.50 Since 1980, however, courts have begun to reject the
Harding rule because of its failure to critically analyze the ef-
fects of hypnosis.5 1
45. 5 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302 (1968), cert. denied sub nom. Harding v. Mary-
land, 395 U.S. 949 (1969). Other criminal cases have dealt with hypnosis in varying con-
texts. See, e.g., People v. Modesto, 59 Cal. 2d 722, 382 P.2d 33, 31 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1963)
(with proper foundation presented for reliability, expert opinion on defendant's mens rea
derived from hypnotic interview held admissible); People v. Busch, 56 Cal. 2d 868, 366
P.2d 314, 16 Cal. Rptr. 898 (1961) (expert opinion on defendant's mens rea derived from
hypnotic interview, excluded for lack of proper foundation of reliability); Cornell v. Su-
perior Court, 52 Cal. 2d 99, 338 P.2d 447 (1959) (defense counsel permitted to examine
defendant while hypnotized as part of case preparation); People v. Ebanks, 117 Cal. 652,
49 P. 1049 (1897) (defendant's statement of innocence while hypnotized inadmissible).
These cases are representative of other attempted uses of hypnosis. For an exhaustive
review of other uses, see Note, supra note 7, at 1204-05.
46. Harding v. State, 5 Md. App. at 235, 246 A.2d at 304-05.
47. Id. at 240, 246 A.2d at 308. This observation is clearly contrary to the leading
body of knowledge today. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 15-21.
48. Harding v. State, 5 Md. App. at 246-47, 246 A.2d at 312.
49. Id. at 244, 246 A.2d at 310.
50. See, e.g., United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
885 (1979); United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006
(1978); Clark v. State, 379 So. 2d 372 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); People v. Smrekar, 68
Ill. App. 3d 379, 385 N.E.2d 848 (1979); State v. Greer, 609 S.W.2d 423 (Mo. App. 1980),
vacated on other grounds, 450 U.S. 1027 (1981); State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86
(1981) (see infra text accompanying notes 66-68); State v. McQueen, 295 N.C. 96, 244
S.E.2d 414 (1978); State v. Jorgensen, 8 Or. App. 1, 492 P.2d 312 (1971); Chapman v.
State, 632 P.2d 1280 (Wyo. 1982). Two New York cases prior to Hughes allowed admis-
sion of hypnotically refreshed testimony if nine procedural safeguards were first met. See
People v. Lewis, 103 Misc. 2d 881, 427 N.Y.S.2d 177 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1980); People
v. McDowell, 103 Misc. 2d 831, 427 N.Y.S.2d 181 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1980).
51. See cases cited infra note 60.
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In 1980, in State v. Mack," the testimony of a victim, una-
ble to remember her attacker until hypnotized, was admitted
into evidence over the objection of defense counsel.53 On appeal
to the United States District Court for Minnesota, the court un-
dertook a thorough review of the nature and effects of hypno-
sis." The court then applied a variant of the test enunciated by
the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia in United States v. Frye.55 The court in Frye stated
that a scientific method, to be admissible, "must be sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular
field in which it belongs."' The Mack court determined, inter
alia, that the results of "scientific testing are not admissible un-
less the testing has developed or improved to the point where
experts in the field widely share the view that the results are
scientifically reliable as accurate. '57 The court held that, in view
of its inherent dangers of suggestibility and confabulation, hyp-
nosis could not pass this test.58 Accordingly, the hypnotically re-
freshed testimony was held inadmissible.5 9
Several jurisdictions have followed the Mack approach and
have reached a relatively uniform conclusion: hypnotically re-
freshed testimony is not scientifically accurate." Notably, Mary-
land overruled the precedent established in Harding in the wake
52. 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980).
53. Id. at 765.
54. The Mack court heard testimony of five expert witnesses and had before it amici
curiae briefs from the California Attorneys for Criminal Justice and the Minnesota State
Public Defender. Id. at 765-66. The court took note of the same effects that are reviewed
supra at text accompanying notes 15-31.
55. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (holding the results of a lie detector test
inadmissible).
56. Id. at 1014.
57. State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d at 768.
58. Id. at 768-72.
59. Id. at 772.
60. See, e.g., State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 644 P.2d 1266
(1982); State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226, 624 P.2d 1274 (1981); State v. Collins, 296 Md. 670,
464 A.2d 1028 (1983); Commonwealth v. Kater, 388 Mass. 519, 447 N.E.2d 1190 (1983);
People v. Gonzales, 417 Mich. 968, 336 N.W.2d 75 (1983); People v. Wallach, 110 Mich.
App. 37, 312 N.W.2d 108 (1981); State v. Koehler, 312 N.W.2d 108 (Minn. 1981); State v.
Palmer, 215 Neb. 273, 338 N.W.2d 281 (1983); Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa.
97, 436 A.2d 170 (1981); Commonwealth v. Taylor, 294 Pa. Super. 171, 439 A.2d 805
(1982). As in Mack, these cases allow prehypnotic testimony, while holding hypnotically
refreshed recollections inadmissable.
1984]
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of the Mack decision, and held such testimony inadmissible. 1
In People v. Shirley,62 California went beyond simply re-
jecting hypnotically refreshed testimony. The California Su-
preme Court held that a previously hypnotized witness may not
testify about any topics related to events discussed during the
hypnotic session." At least one commentator has suggested that
this rule could significantly discourage the use of investigative
hypnosis in California." Law enforcement officials must consider
Shirley before using'investigative hypnosis, for even if no new
information is recalled during the hypnosis, the witness cannot
testify about original recollections if they were discussed during
hypnosis. s
New Jersey has taken another approach, making the admis-
sibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony conditional. In State
v. Hurd," the New Jersey Supreme Court held that hypnotically
refreshed testimony may be admissible if certain procedural
safeguards are followed at the hypnotic session. 7 The court sug-
gested that:
(1.) The hypnotic session should be conducted by a psychi-
atrist or psychologist experienced in the use of hypnosis;
(2.) he or she should be independent, not regularly em-
ployed by either party;
(3.) any information given to the hypnotist should be
recorded;
(4.) before inducing the hypnosis the hypnotist should ob-
tain a detailed description of the facts the subject presently re-
calls, and should avoid influencing the description;
(5.) all contacts between the hypnotist and the subject
should be recorded;
(6.) only the hypnotist and the subject should be present
61. State v. Collins, 296 Md. at 703, 464 A.2d at 1044-45.
62. 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 133
(1982).
63. Id. at 66-67, 641 P.2d at 804, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 272-73.
64. This is the obvious logical inference in light of the court's holding. See generally
Beaver, Memory Restored or Confabulated by Hypnosis-Is it Competent?, 6 U. PUGET
SouND L. REV. 155, 175-80 (1983).
65. People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 66-67, 641 P.2d at 804, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 272-73.
66. 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981).
67. Id. at 545-46, 432 A.2d at 96-97.
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during any phase of the hypnotic session.e Since these safe-
guards were lacking in Hurd, the testimony in that case was held
inadmissible.6 9
Similarly, in New York, two lower courts have adopted nine
procedural safeguards for admissibility.70 These substantially
mirror those given in Hurd, with the additional requirement
that hypnotically recalled information be independently
corroborated.
Although there is presently a lack of uniform treatment of
hypnotically refreshed testimony, the most recent cases indicate
a trend toward finding the testimony inadmissible.7 2 Many juris-
dictions, however, have either not decided the issue 7 or cling to
an earlier rule allowing the testimony to be admitted. For this
reason, and because of the traditionally influential character of
New York decisions, Hughes and the procedure it prescribes will
be under careful scrutiny by the legal community.
III. People v. Hughes
A. Treatment at Trial
Kirk Hughes was indicted by an Onondaga County grand
jury on charges of first degree rape and burglary and of second
degree assault.1 4 He had been the prime suspect in the rape even
before his victim was able to identify him for the first time at
two hypnotic sessions.75 In a pretrial motion the defendant
68. Id. But cf. People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 39-40, 641 P.2d at 787-88, 181 Cal.
Rptr. at 255-56. Criticizing the Hurd safeguards, the California court noted that "the
game is not worth the candle.' Id.
69. State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. at 548, 432 A.2d at 98.
70. People v. Lewis, 103 Misc. 2d 881, 883, 427 N.Y.S.2d 177, 179 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1980); People v. McDowell, 103 Misc. 2d 831, 834-36, 427 N.Y.S.2d 181, 182-84
(Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1980). These cases were later overruled by the Hughes
decision.
71. People v. Lewis, 103 Misc. 2d 881, 883, 427 N.Y.S.2d 177, 179 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1980); People v. McDowell, 103 Misc. 2d 831, 834-36, 427 N.Y.S.2d 181, 182-84
(Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1980).
72. See cases cited supra note 60.
73. E.g., United States v. Miller, 411 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1969); Strong v. State, 435
N.E.2d 969 (Ind. 1982); Lawson v. State, 280 N.W.2d 400 (Iowa 1979); Commonwealth v.
A Juvenile, 381 Mass. 727, 412 N.E.2d 339 (1980).
74. People v. Hughes, 99 Misc. 2d 863, 864, 417 N.Y.S.2d 643, 644 (Sup. Ct. Onon-
daga County 1979).
75. People v. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d 523, 528, 453 N.E.2d 484, 486, 466 N.Y.S.2d 255,
1984]
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moved to suppress7 6 the victim's hypnotic identification; in the
alternative, he requested a pretrial hearing77  to determine
whether the hypnosis was improper due to its suggestiveness. 8
The trial court denied the motion to suppress,79 but ordered a
pretrial hearing because "[tlhe police initiated use of hypnosis is
S. . properly the subject of a pretrial hearing to determine
whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the procedures
used were so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to the very
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification." 0
At the pretrial hearing that followed," the prosecutor's ex-
pert witness, who had conducted the two hypnotic sessions with
the victim, testified that the victim had shown by her manner-
isms and answers while hypnotized that she was not confabu-
lating. 2 Based on the hypnotist's observations, corroborative
statements made by the victim's neighbors,83 and the victim's
257 (1983). The victim identified Hughes at both hypnotic sessions (recorded on video
tape) with a hypnotist retained by the police. She was also hypnotized by a hypnotist she
retained without police involvement, and she again identified Hughes as the rapist. This
private hypnotist also administered sodium pentothal to the victim, and again she iden-
tified Hughes. Id. at 530-31, 453 N.E.2d at 486-87, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 257-58.
76. Id. at 527, 453 N.E.2d at 485, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 256.
77. Id. This pretrial request was based on New York Criminal Procedure Law §§
710.20 and 710.30. The purpose of this statutory hearing is to suppress testimony at trial
that "would not be admissible upon the prospective trial of such charge owing to an
improperly made previous identification of the defendant by the prospective witness."
N.Y. CraM. PRoc. LAW § 710.20(b)(5) (McKinney 1982). Compare this statutory hearing
with the court of appeals' judicially required pretrial hearing, discussed infra at text
accompanying notes 107-20.
78. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d at 527, 453 N.E.2d at 485, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 256.
79. Id. at 531, 453 N.E.2d at 487, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 258. In denying the motion, the
court stated: "Given a proper foundation of general acceptance in the scientific commu-
nity and adequate procedural safeguards to insure reliability, this Court believes that
evidence elicited through hypnosis can be valuable to the determination of guilt or inno-
cence of those who have been accused of crimes." People v. Hughes, 99 Misc. 2d at 871,
417 N.Y.S.2d at 648.
80. People v. Hughes, 99 Misc. 2d at 872, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 649.
81. Onondaga County Court Judge Ormond N. Gale issued an unpublished memo-
randum/order, Index No. 78/873, November 26, 1979, which is reprinted in the appendix
of Respondent's Brief to the Appellate Division. Brief for Respondent at A15, People v.
Hughes, 88 A.D.2d 17, 452 N.Y.S.2d 929 (4th Dep't 1982).
82. Id. at A23.
83. Both expert witnesses agreed that corroboration is needed to show that the wit-
ness did not confabulate while hypnotized. To this end, the prosecutor offered state-
ments by three of the victim's neighbors placing the defendant at the scene at the time
of the rape. Id.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol4/iss3/7
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own prehypnotic statements, the court ruled that the People
had met their burden of proving that the hypnotically refreshed
testimony was reliable. 4
Subsequently, the jury heard the victim identify Hughes as
the rapist based on her hypnotic recollections." The court
charged the jury to consider the reliability of hypnosis in general
and the victim's testimony in particular, emphasizing that both
must be considered reliable for the testimony to be used as evi-
dence of guilt.8 6 The jury returned a verdict of guilty.87
B. The Appellate Division
The Appellate Division, Fourth Department reversed and
ordered a new trial.88 The appellate court disagreed with the
findings of the trial court that hypnosis satisfied the United
States v. Frye" standard of admissibility.90 In its view, hypnosis
was not generally accepted as reliable in the scientific commu-
nity.91 The court went on to hold, without exposition, "that it
does not follow that because she has been hypnotized, [the vic-
tim] is incompetent to testify to facts which she was able to re-
call prior to undergoing hypnosis."12 Thus, the victim was free to
testify about prehypnotic recollections, but all hypnotically re-
called testimony was inadmissible. 93
84. Id. at A24.
85. People v. Hughes, 88 A.D.2d at 19, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 930.
86. Brief for Respondent at A28-A29, People v. Hughes, 88 A.D.2d 17, 452 N.Y.S.2d
929 (4th Dep't 1982) (Judge Gale's charge regarding hypnotically-aided testimony).
87. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d at 532, 453 N.E.2d at 488, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 259.
88. People v. Hughes, 88 A.D.2d at 22, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 932.
89. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
90. People v. Hughes, 88 A.D.2d at 21, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 932. The trial court, appel-
late division, and court of appeals all agreed that New York law required use of the Frye
test. For prior New York cases applying Frye, see People v. Middleton, 54 N.Y.2d 42, 429
N.E.2d 100, 444 N.Y.S.2d 581 (1981) (results of bite mark test admissible); People v.
Tarsia, 50 N.Y.2d 1, 405 N.E.2d 188, 427 N.Y.S.2d 944 (1980) (voice stress test admissi-
ble); People v. Allweiss, 48 N.Y.2d 40, 396 N.E.2d 735, 421 N.Y.S.2d 341 (1979) (evidence
from hair comparison admissible).
91. People v. Hughes, 88 A.D.2d at 22, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 932.
92. Id. (452 N.Y.S.2d at 932 misquotes the official report of the opinion here).
93. Id.
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IV. Decision of the Court
A. Hypnotically Refreshed Testimony
In People v. Hughes, the court of appeals affirmed the ap-
pellate division in holding that hypnotically refreshed recollec-
tions are inadmissible as testimony. The court, however, dis-
agreed with the conclusory statement of the appellate division
that the witness was not incompetent to testify about
prehypnotic recollections.' Rather, the court held that
prehypnotic recollections must be proven free of taint in a pre-
trial hearing before the witness may give testimony based on
such recollections.9 5
After a thorough review of hypnosis and the case law sur-
rounding it,"' the court began its analysis by noting possible con-
stitutional questions.'7 The court declined to decide the case on
a constitutional basis, however, noting that any such decision
would be limited to cases where the hypnosis involved state ac-
tion." The use of testimony resulting from the hypnosis of a wit-
ness without police participation, therefore, would not be ad-
dressed." Noting that the "common law rules of evidence ...
are not so limited in their application and do not require an ele-
ment of State action,"100 the court rested its decision on eviden-
tiary considerations rather than constitutional grounds. 101
The court began its examination with the premise that any
witness identification procedure must first establish "a very high
level of reliability, tantamount to certainty, as a predicate for its
admissibility." 0 2 To test hypnosis under this standard, the court
framed the issue as "whether hypnosis has gained general ac-
94. Id. at 546, 453 N.E.2d at 496, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 267.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 533-40, 453 N.E.2d at 488-93, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 259-64.
97. Id. at 541-42, 453 N.E.2d at 493-94, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 264-65. See supra text ac-
companying notes 35-44. See also Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 224-25 (1977) (sixth
amendment confrontation clause analysis of analogous suggestive identification).
98. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d at 542, 453 N.E.2d at 494, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 265.
99. 1d.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 542, 453 N.E.2d at 493, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 264. The court explained this
requirement as "appropriate when the fallibility of the scientific procedure might di-
rectly affect the fact finder's assessment of eyewitness credibility." Id. See People v.
Allweiss, 48 N.Y.2d 40, 50, 396 N.E.2d 735, 740, 421 N.Y.S.2d 341, 346 (1979).
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ceptance in the scientific community as a reliable means of re-
storing recollection." 103 Applying this test to the particular ef-
fects of hypnosis, the court categorically rejected hypnotically
refreshed testimony by focusing on the danger that the subject
will confabulate during hypnosis.1°4 In the court's view, the risk
of actual confabulation was the determinitive factor of admissi-
bility: "No procedures have yet been devised for eliminating the
common risk that the subject himself is more likely to confabu-
late or fantasize to fill in gaps in his memory as a result of the
hypnotic process. Nor is there any scientific method for de-
tecting this type of 'recollection' .... ."105 In view of these
significant flaws, the court held that hypnotically refreshed testi-
mony cannot be presented to the trier of fact.10°
B. The Pretrial Procedure
In holding hypnotic recollections inadmissible, the court
raised two new issues in need of resolution: how to exclude hyp-
notic recollections from testimony, and how to treat testimony
concerning prehypnotic recollections. As to this second question,
the court was cognizant of the fact that hypnosis can affect
prehypnotic recollections by tainting the witness with an in-
creased confidence in the veracity of those original recollec-
tions.1 07 Concerned that this unwarranted confidence could im-
pair the defendant's right of cross-examination, the court held
that prehypnotic recollections must be free of this taint to be
admissible.10 8
The court responded to the issues of how to exclude hyp-
notic recollections and how to treat potentially tainted
prehypnotic recollections by requiring a pretrial hearing to re-
solve these matters. 10 The purpose of the hearing is to deter-
103. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d at 543, 453 N.E.2d at 494, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 265.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 544, 543 N.E.2d at 495, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 266.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 546, 453 N.E.2d at 496, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 267. The court observed that
"[t]he problem is greatest when the hypnotist suggests to the person under hypnosis that
a certain event occurred or that the person will recall everything when he returns to the
normal state of consciousness." Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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mine, in the words of the court, "the extent of the witness's
prehypnotic recollection (which would establish the boundaries
of admissible testimony) and whether the hypnotism was so im-
permissibly suggestive as to require exclusion of in-court testi-
mony with respect to such prehypnotic recollection." 110
It is at this juncture that Hughes parts company with case
law by establishing a pretrial procedure to resolve these ques-
tions.' The uniqueness of such a pretrial hearing, however,
presented the court with the task of prescribing procedure and
guidelines for the hearing's practical operation."' The court re-
sponded by delegating to the trial courts the task of formulating
specific procedural standards on a case-by-case basis, 1 3 within
certain general guidelines.
First, according to the court, testimonial and documentary
evidence relating to scope and content of prehypnotic recollec-
tions should be offered, with "full opportunity . . . afforded
counsel to test the probative worth of the proof offered."" " Sec-
ond, detailed proof is needed to establish the procedures used at
the hypnotic session." 5 To this end, the court suggested that
proof of compliance with the standards adopted in State v.
Hurd"6 would be relevant. 1 7 Third, the burden is on the People
to prove by clear and convincing evidence' 1 8 that the defend-
ant's right of cross-examination has not been substantially im-
paired by an overly suggestive procedure at the hypnotic ses-
sion. 1 9 Finally, the court held, if the prehypnotic testimony of
110. Id. (footnote omitted).
111. No reported cases were found which require a similar dual-purpose pretrial
hearing.
112. The court noted that "[1]ittle reported authority is available as a basis on
which to prescribe guidelines for such inquiry and resolution." Id. at 546-47, 453 N.E.2d
at 496, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 267.
113. Id. at 547, 453 N.E.2d at 496, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 267.
114. Id. The court noted, by analogy to suppression hearings, that hearsay testi-
mony is admissible at the pretrial hearing. Id. at 547 n.39, 453 N.E.2d at 496 n.39, 466
N.Y.S.2d at 267 n.39. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 710.60(4) (McKinney 1982).
115. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d at 547, 453 N.E.2d at 496, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 267.
116. 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981). The Hurd standards are set forth supra at text
accompanying note 68.
117. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d at 548, 453 N.E.2d at 497, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 268.
118. Id. The clear and convincing standard is discussed infra at text accompanying
notes 146-47.
119. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d at 548, 453 N.E.2d at 497, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 268.
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the witness is cleared for admission at trial, the defendant may
present evidence at trial of the procedures used at the hypnotic
session and expert testimony pertaining to the potential effects
of hypnosis on the witness' recollections.1 20 In addition, the de-
fendant may request a charge to the jury concerning the risk of
increased confidence by the witness in his or her recollections. 121,
V. Analysis
A. Alternative Rationales for Inadmissibility
The court did not have to decide People v. Hughes12 2 by
applying the per se rule of inadmissibility. Rather, the holding
could have been much narrower if it had been confined to the
facts of the case. Before her hypnosis, the victim had been inad-
vertently informed by her husband that Hughes was the only
suspect in the rape.' 23 The planting of this suggestion of the rap-
ist's identity might have served for the basis of a narrower hold-
ing that hypnotic recall is inadmissible when so tainted by
suggestion.
To have reached the broader holding of Hughes, the court
must have believed that hypnotic recall is unreliable in any fac-
tual setting.12 4 In this regard, it joins a growing number of
courts 25  rejecting hypnotically refreshed testimony as
unreliable.
Given the inherent suggestiveness of hypnosis12 6 and the
court's own strict due process scrutiny of suggestive identifica-
tions,127 the court could have decided the case on constitutional
grounds.' 28 The suggestive nature of hypnosis could be perceived
120. Id. To facilitate this defense opportunity, the court required that the defend-
ant be given pretrial notice of the prosecutor's intention to use the testimony of a previ-
ously hypnotized witness. Id. at 548 n.42, 453 N.E.2d at 497 n.42, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 268
n.42.
121. Id. at 548, 453 N.E.2d at 497, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 268.
122. 59 N.Y.2d 523, 453 N.E.2d 484, 466 N.Y.S.2d 255 (1983).
123. Id. at 529-30, 453 N.E.2d at 486, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 257.
124. Id. at 543, 453 N.E.2d at 494, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 265.
125. See cases cited supra note 60.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 15-22.
127. See People v. Adams, 53 N.Y.2d 241, 423 N.E.2d 379, 440 N.Y.S.2d 902 (1981).
See supra text accompanying notes 41-44.
128. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d at 542, 453 N.E.2d at 494, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 265. See supra
text accompanying notes 96-101 (court's analysis of constitutional holding). See also
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as impairing the accused's right to effective cross-examination, a
right guaranteed by the confrontation clause of the federal Con-
stitution. 2 e The court, however, chose not to adopt this
rationale.130
The wisdom behind making the rule on admissibility an evi-
dentiary, rather than a constitutional, matter is to be applauded.
First, the court eliminated the possibility that the Supreme
Court would overrule Hughes on the constitutional issue.' 3 ' Sec-
ond, by making the rule an evidentiary matter, the court may
have made Hughes applicable to civil as well as criminal cases.'3 2
Finally, the Hughes rule will apply where a witness employs a
private hypnotist to facilitate additional recall, whereas a consti-
tutional holding would apply only where there is the necessary
element of state action. 33
The court showed equal acumen in rejecting the Hurd safe-
guards3 for admissibility as an alternative holding. Although
the safeguards work to minimize suggestibility, the risk of con-
fabulation remains, and these safeguards do little to detect or
prevent subject confabulation." 5
B. The Pretrial Procedure and Suggested Approaches
Excluding hypnotically refreshed testimony necessarily re-
quires defining the point at which the witness' unaided recollec-
tion ends and hypnotic recall begins. This is the purpose of the
pretrial proceeding. In Hughes the task may appear deceptively
simple, as the victim's identification of her attacker was clearly
supra text accompanying notes 35-37 (fourteenth amendment due process applicability
to suggestive identifications).
129. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
130. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d at 542, 453 N.E.2d at 494, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 265. See supra
text accompanying notes 100-01.
131. The New York Court of Appeals in Hughes observed that "[t]he vagaries of
eyewitness identification have long been a concern of this court which has on occassion
gone further than the Federal Constitution requires in order to further minimize the risk
of mistaken identification." Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d at 542, 453 N.E.2d at 494, 466 N.Y.S.2d
at 265. See also the Stovall-Adams comparison, supra text accompanying notes 38-44.
132. This proposition remains to be tested in New York.
133. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d at 542, 453 N.E.2d at 494, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 265.
134. See supra text accompanying note 68.
135. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d at 544, 453 N.E.2d at 494-95, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 265-66.
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brought out through hypnosis."" Future cases, however, could
present more difficult problems of delineation, such as in a situ-
ation where the previously hypnotized witness remembers addi-
tional information some days or weeks after the hypnosis. 17 The
court stated, in a footnote, that "great care should be taken to
assure that any such delayed recall was unaffected by and not a
product of the hypnosis.' 3 8
Due to the nature of hypnosis, the previously hypnotized
witness may be the least credible source of testimonial evidence
at the hearing, and therefore cannot be relied upon in an at-
tempt to isolate hypnotic recollections. This is so in part because
the witness may demonstrate increased confidence in all recol-
lections.3 9 Secondly, the witness may be unable to distinguish
between original and hypnotic recall.140 For these reasons, the
witness' testimony at this stage of the hearing is particularly
susceptible to objection. Other methods will be necessary to dis-
tinguish admissible from inadmissible recollections. Proof of the
safeguards employed at the hypnotic session seems pertinent, if
not necessary.""
To preserve such proof for the hearing, the parties involved
with the hypnotic session should record the session to facilitate
isolating hypnotic recollections at the hearing. Although this was
suggested in Hurd to promote admissibility, " 2 recording seems
equally appropriate for the purposes of the Hughes hearing. 4 3
136. The victim twice named Hughes prior to hypnosis, stating "I saw Kirk"
(Hughes' first name), when asked what had happened to her. These statements, however,
were not made in the context of an identification. Id. at 528, 453 N.E.2d at 486, 466
N.Y.S.2d at 257.
137. This situation was presented in Commonwealth v. Kater, 388 Mass. 519, 447
N.E.2d 1190 (1983). That court did not, however, rule on the propriety of such recollec-
tion. See also, Diamond, supra note 1, at 333. Professor Diamond argues convincingly
that the witness cannot distinguish between original thoughts and those implanted dur-
ing hypnosis.
138. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d at 546 n.38, 453 N.E.2d at 496 n.38, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 267
n.38.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 23-28.
140. See supra text accompanying note 22.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 116-17.
142. State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. at 545, 432 A.2d at 96.
143. The victim's hypnotic sessions in Hughes were recorded with both audio and
video equipment. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d at 530, 453 N.E.2d at 486, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 257. See
supra note 75.
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Recording would aid in proving the absence of suggestiveness
during hypnosis, and thus would further the People's case for
admission of testimony concerning the witness' prehypnotic
recollections.
Should the proof take the form of expert opinion concerning
the degree of suggestiveness at the hypnotic session, the experts'
conflicting conclusions could present a serious problem to the
trial judge ill-equipped to weigh such testimony. For this reason,
the Supreme Court of California rejected a Hughes-type hearing
because the inquiry would involve "scientific issues so subtle as
to confound the experts."14' It must be noted that the California
approach excludes potentially probative evidence to avoid the
burdens its use would impose on the courts. Clearly, the Hughes
court considered the burden worth the benefits attendant to pre-
serving reliable prehypnotic testimony for consideration by the
finder of fact. 145
At the hearing the People have the burden of proving, by
clear and convincing evidence, that the testimony is un-
tainted. 46 This standard is higher than a preponderance of the
evidence, albeit lower than beyond a reasonable doubt. 47 Yet
there exists a significant incentive to meet the burden. For the
prosecutor seeking to introduce prehypnotic testimony of a wit-
ness, the pretrial hearing is crucial. If prehypnotic testimony
cannot be delineated and proven free of taint before trial, all
testimony relating to the crime discussed during hypnosis will
then be inadmissible."48
C. Procedure at the Hearing
Concerning the order of issues to be addressed at the hear-
ing, logic would dictate that severing tainted hypnotic recollec-
tions from untainted recall should be the initial step. If the
court is unable to isolate these recollections, there is then no
144. People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 40, 641 P.2d 775, 787, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 255,
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 133 (1982).
145. See Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d at 539-40, 453 N.E.2d at 492, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 263.
146. Id. at 547, 453 N.E.2d at 496, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 267.
147. Accord People v. Pobliner, 32 N.Y.2d 356, 368, 298 N.E.2d 637, 644, 345
N.Y.S.2d 482, 491 (1973). See also Rosenthal v. Harnett, 36 N.Y.2d 269, 274, 326 N.E.2d
811, 814, 367 N.Y.S.2d 247, 250 (1975).
148. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d at 546-47, 453 N.E.2d at 496, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 267.
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need to proceed to the second requirement of proving
prehypnotic recall free of hypnotic taint.149 If this second stage
of the hearing is reached, the prosecutor is faced with the task of
demonstrating by clear and convincing proof that the witness'
testimony regarding prehypnotic recollection will be reliable and
that "there has been no substantial impairment of the defend-
ant's right of cross-examination. '150
To this end, the prosecutor might employ the trial tech-
nique of bolstering the witness' credibility on recross-examina-
tion after the defense has attempted to impeach the witness on
cross-examination. This may not be wholly adequate, however,
since the defendant may object to the propriety of using the wit-
ness as a testimonial source' when the issue is in fact the same
witness' veracity. 52 This objection would be based on the possi-
bility that the witness had acquired an increased confidence in
her recollections. " As the court suggests, perhaps the best way
to overcome this defense objection is to prove the effectiveness
of procedures used to minimize suggestive elements.'5 Proof in
the negative may be helpful. Showing the absence of statements
by the hypnotist which act as suggestions for accurate recall, for
instance, would further the People's case.
If the prosecutor succeeds in proving that the prehypnotic
testimony is free of taint, the defendant has two opportunities to
attack the witness' credibility at trial. First, he may introduce
proof relating to the procedures used for the hypnosis, as well as
expert testimony with respect to the possible effects of hypno-
sis. 1" Second, the defendant may request a charge to the jury
describing the possibility that the witness demonstrated undue
confidence in her testimony while relating her recollections.5 6
Because the general public has a favorable impression of a hyp-
149. Id.
150. Id. at 547, 453 N.E.2d at 497, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 268.
151. Expert opinion could be employed by the defense to highlight the danger of the
witness' increased confidence in prehypnotic recollections. See supra text accompanying
notes 23-28.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 23-28.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 23-28.
154. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d at 547, 453 N.E.2d at 496, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 267.
155. Id. at 548, 453 N.E.2d at 496, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 268.
156. Id.
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notist's ability to elicit truth,5 7 the defendant must first over-
come this presumption in the minds of the jurors. Care should
be taken, however, not to overwhelm the jury with a mass of
technical information. The Hughes court concluded that these
two defense opportunities "represent a reasonable accomodation
between the legitimate uses of hypnosis and the defendant's
right of confrontation.' 1 58 By providing these opportunities,
however, the court is allowing the defendant to reargue matters
before the jury that were presumably settled in the prosecutor's
favor at the pretrial hearing (i.e., the veracity of the witness' tes-
timony). If, at the hearing, the prosecutor has shown by clear
and convincing proof that the prehypnotic testimony does not
suffer from an impermissible taint, should not the defendant be
precluded from rearguing this point in the jury's presence? To
allow the defendant to reopen the issue seems to negate all that
the prosecutor is required to prove at the hearing. Judging the
weight to be accorded testimony, however, is the special prov-
ince of the jury. Nevertheless, since the testimony was admitted
only because it had been proven unaffected by the hypnosis, the
jury should weigh the testimony as it would any other testimony
based on normal recollections. Thus, the opportunity at trial to
introduce evidence relating the hypnotic procedures used and to
request a jury charge on increased confidence in recollections
provides the defendant with an unfair advantage, to the detri-
ment of the People's case.
VI. Conclusion
It is evident that in the wake of People v. Hughes,'59 the use
of hypnosis will not be favored by prosecutors, given the high
hurdle that the pretrial hearing presents. In cases where hypno-
sis has been used and prehypnotic recollections are crucial to the
case, the Hughes hearing serves to protect defendants from po-
tentially false testimony by requiring the People to prove that
the testimony is reliable before its introduction at trial.
Although ending for now the question of admissibility of
157. Orne, supra note 4, at 313.
158. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d at 548, 453 N.E.2d at 497, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 268 (footnote
omitted).
159. 59 N.Y.2d 523, 453 N.E.2d 484, 466 N.Y.S.2d 255 (1983).
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hypnotically refreshed testimony, the New York Court of Ap-
peals has opened the door to new questions about the pretrial
procedure and its appropriate operation. The degree of protec-
tion from the use of potentially tainted prehypnotic recollections
must now be established by the trial courts.
Albert J. D'Aquino
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